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hile the federal government claims “[o]wning a home is 
part of the American dream,”1 the housing boom of the 
late 1990s and early 2000s and the resulting increase in home 
prices made it difficult for individuals to finance the purchase of 
a home, particularly for those with low income or poor credit.2  
In response, many mortgage lenders began offering loans in 
greater amounts to those higher-risk borrowers, on terms more 
favorable to the lender and less favorable to the borrower.  Such 
“subprime” loans helped higher-risk borrowers purchase homes 
or refinance existing loans while providing higher fees and 
interest rates to lenders to compensate for the additional risk 
those borrowers represented. 
 
∗ J.D. Candidate, University of Oregon School of Law, 2009; B.A., University of 
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1 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., INTEREST-ONLY 
MORTGAGE PAYMENTS AND PAYMENT-OPTION ARMS–ARE THEY FOR YOU? 1 
(2006), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/mortgage%5Finterestonly/mortgage 
_interestonly.pdf. 
2 Id. 
W 
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Such loans quickly became big business, as the subprime loan 
market grew from $35 billion in 1994 to $665 billion in 2005.3  
Between 1998 and 2006, lenders loaned more than $2 trillion in 
subprime home loans.4  In recent years, however, such 
unfavorable loan terms have caused large numbers of borrowers 
to default on their loans, resulting in a swelling of foreclosures.  
The steadily growing number of foreclosures has caused many 
businesses to fail and continues to cause a large number of 
individuals to lose their homes. 
Existing regulations have failed to prevent or remedy the 
subprime loan crisis and, if left unchanged, will fail to prevent a 
similar crisis from reccurring in the future.  As a result, 
lawmakers and regulators in Washington have suggested several 
remedial measures to deal with the subprime loan crisis, 
including the following: (1) freezing subprime interest rates;5 (2) 
allowing bankruptcy judges to reduce the amount of principal 
and interest due on loans;6 (3) providing for the federal 
government to purchase mortgages of homeowners facing 
foreclosure, allowing those homeowners to refinance into more 
affordable loans;7 and (4) requiring that lenders issue a warrant 
or “negative amortization certificate” for the difference between 
the mortgage and a house’s current resale value.8  However, 
these suggestions are only quick fixes that, while helping those 
 
3 ELLEN SCHLOEMER, WEI LI, KEITH ERNST & KATHLEEN KEEST, LOSING 
GROUND: FORECLOSURES IN THE SUBPRIME MARKET AND THEIR COST TO 
HOMEOWNERS 7 (2006), http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/foreclosure-paper-
report-2-17.pdf.  However, since 2005, the subprime market decreased to $650 
billion in 2007.  Heather M. Tashman, The Subprime Lending Industry: An Industry 
in Crisis, 124 BANKING L.J. 407, 407 (2007). 
4 CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, SUBPRIME LENDING: A NET DRAIN ON 
HOMEOWNERSHIP 2 (2007), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/ 
Net-Drain-in-Home-Ownership.pdf. 
5 Les Christie, Clinton Calls for Subprime Rate Freeze, CNN MONEY, Dec. 5, 
2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/12/05/real_estate/Clinton_foreclosure_prevention/ 
index.htm. 
6 Jeanne Sahadi, Housing Relief Bill: It Ain’t Over ’Til It’s Over, CNN MONEY, 
Feb. 29, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/02/29/news/economy/housing_stim 
_presser/index.htm. 
7 The Associated Press, U.S. Moves to Free Up Funds for Homeowners, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/19/business/apee-fannie 
.html. 
8 Les Christie, Mortgage Crisis: Don’t Forgive Debt, Just Postpone Repayment, 
CNN MONEY, Feb. 20, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/02/20/real_estate/OTC 
_refinance_plan/index.htm. 
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currently in trouble, do not address the risky loan practices that 
caused the subprime crisis in the first place.  As a result, they will 
not stop another crisis from occurring in the future. 
This Comment examines the subprime loan market and the 
inadequacies of current federal and state regulations to protect 
borrowers.  Its purpose is not only to demonstrate why current 
regulations are flawed, but also to show what is needed to stop 
the subprime loan crisis from reccurring. 
Part I of this Comment describes the subprime market today 
and provides a general background for scrutinizing existing 
regulations.  Part II explains the “subprime market,” in which 
subprime loans are packaged and sold as securities to Wall 
Street investors.  Part III examines current federal regulations 
and their inability to sufficiently protect borrowers from the 
risks that subprime loans pose.  Part IV examines similar 
regulations at the state level, and argues that such regulations 
also fail to provide adequate protection.9  Part V explains that 
the increase in foreclosures due to subprime loans has created a 
need for increased regulation.  Finally, Part VI suggests what 
regulatory changes need to be made to protect borrowers and 
ensure another crisis does not occur. 
I 
THE SUBPRIME MARKET TODAY 
Stated simply, subprime loans are loans given to individuals 
with poor credit on terms significantly less favorable than those 
offered to borrowers with better credit.10  Lenders traditionally 
extended financing only to those whose credit history minimized 
the lender’s risk,11 and thus were only willing to extend financing 
to those with poor credit or low income if their risk was 
 
9 These states were chosen because they show the range of regulations that exists 
on the state level, from Oregon’s relative lack of any regulations, to California and 
Florida’s decision to mirror federal regulations, to Minnesota’s attempt to directly 
address the problem.  My hope is that by examining these four states’ laws, 
lawmakers will examine their own states’ statutes and attempt to make changes to 
address the underlying problems of the subprime crisis. 
10 Sue Kirchhoff & Sandra Block, Subprime Loan Market Grows Despite 
Troubles, USA TODAY, Dec. 7, 2004, http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/ 
housing/2004-12-07-subprime-day-2-usat_x.htm. 
11 See R. Stephen Painter Jr., Subprime Lending, Suboptimal Bankruptcy, 38 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 81, 81 (2006). 
MYERS.FMT 12/1/2008  11:36:49 AM 
314 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87, 311 
compensated with higher interest rates and greater fees.12  To 
harness the market those higher-risk borrowers represented, 
lenders in recent years began to develop new loan provisions 
that made such terms more attractive and allowed lower-income 
individuals to qualify for the financing they sought.  Those 
provisions, which comprise “subprime” loans, include the 
following: 
• “Teaser” loans, or Adjustable Rate Mortgages (“ARMs”) 
containing “teaser” rates, which are loans that maintain an 
artificially low interest rate, usually between one and four 
percent,13 for a set period of time, usually between two and 
three years.14  After the introductory period expires, the 
interest rate is reset to a higher variable interest rate, often 
well above the current market rate.15 
• “Balloon” payment provisions, which allow borrowers to 
make interest-only payments until the maturity date of the 
loan, at which time the borrower must pay off the 
remaining loan balance in one large lump sum.16 
• “Negative amortization” provisions, which allow borrowers 
to make lower monthly payments than required to pay off 
both the monthly interest and principal amount.  Such 
provisions add any unpaid amount to the principal 
mortgage  balance,17 thus increasing the total loan amount 
each month. 
• “Piggyback” provisions, which allow borrowers unable to 
afford a down payment on a home to immediately take out 
a  second mortgage (“piggybacked” onto the original loan) 
 
12 Id. at 81–82. 
13 Study Assesses Possible Risks and Impacts of Mortgage Resets, MORTGAGE 
NEWS DAILY, Mar. 26, 2007, http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com/3262007 
_Mortgage_Resets.asp. 
14 Jesse Herman, Foreclosures Expected to Rise After Mortgage Reset, PERSONAL 
HOME LOAN MORTGAGES, http://www.personalhomeloanmortgages.com/articles 
_mortgage_reset.asp (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
15 Id. 
16 Balloon/Reset Mortgages, FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/ 
corporate/buyown/english/mortgages/what_is/balloon_reset.html (last visited Oct. 
20, 2008). 
17 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., supra note 1, at 14. 
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for the remainder of the balance, thus eliminating the need 
for a down payment.18 
• Loans requiring no documentation, known colloquially as 
“liar loans,” allow borrowers to state their ability to repay a 
loan without having to provide supporting documentation 
of assets or income.19  Such “liar loans” allow lenders and 
brokers to offer larger loans–thus providing for more 
interest and fees collected at the closing of the loan–but 
also put the borrower at greater risk of foreclosure by 
enabling the borrower to qualify for a larger loan than he is 
able to repay. 
Subprime loans often combine several of these terms together 
in a single loan.  Because each one of the terms is risky on its 
own, loans combining several such terms are especially 
problematic and create a greater risk of foreclosure.  
Additionally, these terms are extremely confusing in language 
and effect–particularly to unsophisticated borrowers–and only 
add to a borrower’s confusion when combined.  Due to these 
confusing terms, borrowers often do not understand the 
potential risk of subprime loans. 
An example of this problem is the subprime loan that Chevy 
Chase Bank gave Bryan and Susan Andrews.20  Their loan 
included both teaser rate and negative amortization provisions.  
The Andrews were given a teaser rate of 1.950% with a fixed 
monthly payment of $701.21 for five years, at which time the 
payments would increase to an adjusted level of $983.49 
 
18 Karen M. Kroll, Should You Jump on a Piggyback Mortgage?, BANKRATE, 
July 25, 2002, http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mtg/20020725a.asp.  Piggyback 
loan terms vary depending on the lender.  While most lenders require a first 
mortgage of 80%, some will only piggyback an additional 10% or 15%, requiring 
the borrower to come up with a 5% or 10% down payment.  Other lenders do not 
require a down payment at all, and will piggyback a 20% second mortgage onto the 
original mortgage, thus lending 100% of the cost of a new home.  While lending 
100% of a home’s value may seem limited in risk because home values will 
generally increase, this approach is coming back to haunt lenders now that home 
values are decreasing. 
19 Kenneth R. Harney, Lies Are Growing in Loan Process, WASH. POST, July 30, 
2005, at F01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2005/07/29/AR2005072901129.html.  Liar loans are also referred to as “NINAs,” 
which is short for “no income, no asset verification” loans. 
20 See Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 240 F.R.D. 612 (E.D. Wis. 2007). 
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depending on the interest rate.21  However, the Andrews did not 
understand that the teaser rate only applied to the first monthly 
payment.22  Thereafter, the loan allowed for negative 
amortization: when the interest rate increased, their $701.21 
monthly payment failed to fully cover the monthly interest, and 
any unpaid interest was added to the principal balance of the 
loan. 23  As one might expect, the Andrews were shocked and 
angry when they noticed their principal loan balance increased, 
rather than decreased, each month.24  Subprime loan provisions 
can be confusing for anybody; even experienced mortgage 
brokers may have problems understanding subprime loans and 
their terms.25 
Similar to the Andrews, millions of families have in recent 
years taken out subprime loans, many of whom likely did not 
fully understand the risks involved with their loan.  As a result of 
entering into risky loans containing confusing terms, families are 
increasingly losing their homes in foreclosures.  This is in part 
due to the erosion of home equity as home values have sharply 
declined in recent years,26 and in part due to individual 
borrowers’ inability to keep up with monthly payments as 
interest rates adjust upward.27  Together, those forces have 
caused 12.9% of subprime loans issued in 2000 to end in 
foreclosure by May 2005.28  As of March 2008, approximately 
6,000,000 people had subprime loans on their homes.29  Of these 
 
21 See id. at 615–17. 
22 Id. at 615. 
23 Id. 
24 See id. at 612. 
25 See Harney, supra note 19.  One mortgage broker, for example, thought it was 
OK to claim an income as high as necessary for borrowers in order to qualify for a 
loan.  Id. 
26 Press Release, Standard & Poor’s, Continued Record Home Price Declines 
According to the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices (Sept. 30, 2008).  The 10-
City and 20-City Composite Home Price Indices declined 21.1% and 19.5% 
respectively between July 2006 and July 2008.  Id.  Las Vegas posted a 29.9% one-
year decline, while Phoenix, Miami, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Minneapolis, and 
Portland, Oregon, posted 29.3%, 28.2%, 26.2%, 24.8%, 13.1%, and 6.6% declines 
respectively.  Id. 
27 Herman, supra note 14. 
28 SCHLOEMER ET AL., supra note 3, at 11. 
29 Edmund L. Andrews, Relief for Homeowners is Given to a Relative Few, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, at C7. 
MYERS.FMT 12/1/2008  11:36:49 AM 
2008] Foreclosing on the Subprime Loan Crisis 317 
6,000,000, about 408,000, or 6.8%, were in foreclosure.30  An 
additional 1,002,000, or 16.7%, were behind in their payments.31  
Furthermore, it is projected that 19.4% of the subprime loans 
issued during the peak years of 2005 and 2006 will end in 
foreclosure, costing homeowners $74.6 billion, primarily in lost 
equity.32 
The effect of such widespread foreclosures extends well 
beyond the individual borrower.  The Center for Responsible 
Lending predicted that foreclosures on subprime loans 
originating in 2005 and 2006 will devalue 40.6 million 
neighboring homes by approximately $202 billion.33  As a result, 
twenty-four states could lose more than $1 billion each from 
their respective tax bases,34 decreasing each state’s revenues and 
their ability to fund schools, police departments, and other 
public services. 
II 
SECURITIZATION OF THE SUBPRIME LOAN MARKET 
The complex securitization35 of the subprime loan market and 
its lax standards are partly to blame for the current crisis.  In 
order to effectively regulate subprime loans, it is important to 
understand how the subprime loan market works and the 
problems that securitization creates. 
Current regulations–and the lack thereof–have created a 
system that not only allows lenders to create loan products that 
 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 SCHLOEMER ET AL., supra note 3, at 15–16.  Subprime lending reached its peak 
in 2005 and 2006, just as the housing boom began to bust, causing depreciation in 
home prices and interest rates to spike. 
33 CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, SUBPRIME SPILLOVER: FORECLOSURES 
COST NEIGHBORS $202 BILLION; 40.6 MILLION HOMES LOSE $5,000 ON AVERAGE 
1 (2008), http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/subprime-spillover.pdf. 
34 Id. at 2. 
35 Securitization is the complex process of transforming a non-liquid asset or 
group of assets (such as home mortgages) into a single security.  That bundled 
security has greater liquidity than the assets individually, so it can easily be bought 
and sold among investors.  Securitization also was thought to spread the risk of a 
single mortgage default from a single bank to numerous investors.  Wall Street 
believed that a real estate mortgage’s risk of default could accurately be predicted 
through statistical analysis.  See Jonathan Cary, Acquisition Financing: The Current 
Landscape Causes and Consequences of the US Credit Crunch, 1695 P.L.I./Corp. 
513, 518–20 (2008). 
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put borrowers at a high risk of foreclosure, but also gives lenders 
financial incentives to do so.  Moreover, securitization has made 
it difficult for borrowers to hold lenders and related parties 
legally responsible for having taken advantage of them.  Thus, in 
order to provide an adequate set of laws to protect borrowers, 
regulations must address not only the issuance of subprime 
loans, but the process of securitization as well. 
Traditionally, loans involved only two or three parties per 
transaction: a lender, a borrower, and perhaps a guarantor.36  In 
modern times, through securitization, a subprime loan 
transaction can involve up to twelve parties.37  Today’s loans, in 
particular subprime loans, are securitized by combining many 
loans secured by real estate collateral into a mortgage pool and 
selling securitized interests in the mortgage pool to investors.38  
Due to this significant change in loan transactions, many current 
regulations are no longer effective.  In order to provide adequate 
regulations, regulators need to understand and address this 
change. 
A.  The Securitization Process 
A loan transaction today is a complex and elaborate process, 
and securitization makes it only more so.  The process begins 
when a borrower works with a mortgage broker to gain approval 
for a loan.39  The broker will originate the loan in either his or 
her own name40 or the name of the lender, and will almost 
immediately transfer the loan to the lender.41  The lender then 
sells the loan to a different entity, which will package the loan 
 
36 Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2185, 2256 (2007).  Loans traditionally only involved a borrower, a lender, and 
perhaps a federally sponsored institution that would either purchase the loan from 
the lender or guarantee the mortgage.  Id. 
37 Id.  A typical transaction could involve a borrower, a broker, an originator of 
the loan, a seller, an underwriter, a trust, a trustee, multiple servicers, a document 
custodian, an external credit enhancer, a securities placement agent, and investors.  
Id. 
38 Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and 
the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 535–36 (2002). 
39 Id. at 538. 
40 This is done by using funding from a prearranged buyer of the loan, access to a 
warehouse of credit, or through the use of his own money.  Id. 
41 Id. at 538. 
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together with several other loans into a mortgage pool.42  The 
entity will assign the loans to a limited liability entity, known as 
the “seller.”43  The seller will transfer the loans to a Special 
Purpose Vehicle (“SPV”), the sole purpose of which is to hold 
on to the mortgage pool and issue a security to the seller.44  The 
transfer to the SPV is completed in order to reduce the potential 
liability on the seller from the loans and to increase the capital 
liquidity of the loans.45  Because most SPVs are trusts, the 
trustee legally in charge will be responsible for handling the 
operations of the SPV.46 
The seller will then package the securities in a way that 
maximizes their appeal to potential purchasers,47 such as by 
packaging the mortgages into geographically diverse pools.48  
The packages are usually rated by an independent credit-rating 
agency so investors can determine the value of the security and 
the return on investment demanded for the amount of risk 
associated with each security.49  The credit rating systems 
attempt to use a numerical system to quantify the relative 
likelihood that the loans will be repaid by the borrowers in the 
mortgage pool.50  Low-rated securities can be improved by a 
credit enhancement that reduces the risk to an investor.51  This 
can be done by an internal credit enhancement, such as adding 
additional assets to the security to further spread the risk and 
increase value, or through an external credit enhancement by a 
 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 539. 
44 Id.  SPVs are equivalent to Special Purpose Entities (“SPE”), BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1433 (8th ed. 2004), which Enron made famous. 
45 Eggert, supra note 37, at 542.  The SPV is usually a trust because it is 
considered the best entity form to preserve bankruptcy remoteness.  Id. at 542–43.  
Its assets are secure even if the parent or guarantor is subject to bankruptcy 
proceedings.  See id. at 539 n.157.  However, the SPV can also be a corporation, 
limited partnership, or other business entity.  Id. at 539.  Whatever the form of 
organization, the main purpose of SPVs is to separate these risky loans from other 
assets and to isolate the risks associated with the original lender or pooler of the 
loans.  Id. at 542–43. 
46 Id. at 544. 
47 Id. at 539. 
48 Peterson, supra note 36, at 2186–87. 
49 Eggert, supra note 38, at 540. 
50 K.C. McDaniel, Impact of Securitization and Conduit Financing, SM002 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 1149, 1151 (2006). 
51 Eggert, supra note 38, at 540–41. 
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third party, such as adding mortgage insurance to each loan in 
the security.52  Mortgage insurance will insure up to a certain 
percentage of the value of each loan so that an investor’s risk of 
loss will be minimized if the borrower defaults or the loan is 
repaid early.53  In addition, an underwriter will work with the 
seller to package the loan pool54 to ensure that the risk is 
appropriately spread among the assets in the security, and that 
one loan does not impose too much risk to the package as a 
whole.55  The underwriter helps the rating agency examine the 
loans in the pool and set the standard risk-of-loss probability for 
the pool.56  Any loans not meeting that standard are removed 
from the pool and returned to the originator.57 
Once the security is rated, it is sold to investors through 
private placements or public offerings.58  Finally, because the 
SPV and investors do not collect payments from borrowers, the 
SPV through its trustee hires a servicer, a company which 
specializes in collecting and distributing the income and principal 
from the loan pools, to handle the collection efforts, including 
foreclosure proceedings if needed.59 
Similarly, investors sell and assign notes among themselves 
frequently through the Mortgage Electronic Registration 
System, Inc. (“MERS”).60  MERS is a document custodian that 
handles more than half of the home mortgage notes in the 
United States.61  MERS maintains a national database that 
electronically keeps track of the owner and servicer on each 
mortgage in its system.62  MERS records each loan with the 
county under its own name once, and then uses its electronic 
system to facilitate the trading of the mortgage notes without the 
 
52 Id. at 541. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 McDaniel, supra note 50, at 1151. 
56 Eggert, supra note 38, at 541. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 542.  Common investors include private individuals and institutional 
investors such as mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies.  Id. 
59 Id. at 543–44. 
60 See Peterson, supra note 36, at 2211. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
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assignee having to re-record the loan each time they are sold.63  
Additionally, MERS brings foreclosure proceedings in its own 
name–although it is not legally the holder of the note–while 
having the servicer seize the home if the proceeding results in 
foreclosure.64 
B.  Problems Arising Out of the Securitization Process 
The securitization process is complex and has proven 
problematic in many respects.  Understanding these problems is 
important in order to recognize why current regulations fail to 
effectively regulate the subprime market. 
Among the problems the process of securitization has created 
is the fact that no party involved in the securitization process has 
a financial incentive to look beyond its own interests.  Most 
importantly, there is no incentive to look after borrowers.  For 
instance, mortgage brokers may steer borrowers toward lenders 
that provide better compensation packages for the broker, often 
resulting in greater cost to the borrower.65  Further, brokers 
inflate loans to receive kickbacks from loan fees charged to a 
borrower.66  Brokers also are compensated through yield spread 
premiums, which they receive for charging a borrower an 
interest rate above the rate required by the lender.67  Similarly, 
brokers have incentives to push borderline borrowers into 
subprime loans rather than prime loans because they receive 
greater compensation due to kickbacks from the higher interest 
rates charged on subprime loans.68  Moreover, originators 
quickly turn around and resell the loans without concern for the 
 
63 Id. at 2265–66. 
64 Id. at 2266. 
65 Kathleen E. Keest, Stone Soup: Exploring the Boundaries Between Subprime 
Lending and Predatory Lending, 1241 P.L.I./Corp. 1107, 1135 (2001). 
66 Id.  “Inflating” a loan is used here to refer to the practice of encouraging a 
borrower to take out a greater loan than that borrower might otherwise receive or 
ask for. 
67 Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr., Effecting Responsibility in the Mortgage Broker-Borrower 
Relationship: A Role for Agency Principles in Predatory Lending Regulation, 73 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1471, 1514 (2005).  Yield spread premiums are the difference between 
the interest rate the lender requires and the interest rate actually sold to a 
borrower.  Id.  Lenders give brokers a rebate based on this difference.  Id.  Thus, 
brokers often have a financial incentive to charge even higher interest rates than 
demanded by the lender. 
68 See Eggert, supra note 38, at 553–54. 
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quality of the loan.69  Intermediaries (whose job is to combine 
the loans into a mortgage pool) are reluctant to exercise any 
significant diligence because of the size and narrow profit 
margins of the transaction.70  Under most pooling agreements, 
the intermediaries have a right to force originators to take back 
any loan not properly qualified for the pool; as a result, they are 
less concerned with the quality of the loans.71 
Second, the securitization of subprime loans–and of 
mortgages in general–has made it difficult for borrowers to 
assert legal claims or defenses in proceedings by or against the 
borrower.  For example, the holder in due course doctrine, 
which prevents assignee liability72 and shields investors who 
either buy or are assigned a loan, protects investors from the 
claims and defenses a borrower might assert.  This protection 
from liability is particularly significant in light of the growing 
practice of “loan flipping”–unnecessary, predatory 
refinancing–by short-term lending entities that may quickly 
disappear, leaving borrowers with no party against whom to 
assert claims or defenses.73  Additionally, now that brokers and 
lenders turn around and sell the loans almost immediately, they 
are able to issue loans in amounts exceeding the value of their 
assets to cover any potential claims brought by borrowers.74  
Thus, it is increasingly difficult for borrowers to assert claims 
and defenses against brokers, lenders, and investors when 
foreclosure proceedings occur. 
Third, with loans changing hands so frequently, it has become 
difficult to figure out who actually owns a particular mortgage. 
In several cases, that difficulty has resulted in the wrong party 
foreclosing on the note,75 due in part to the absence of any 
 
69 Peterson, supra note 36, at 2271. 
70 McDaniel, supra note 50, at 1151. 
71 Id.  By being able to force loans back onto originators, intermediaries are 
shielded by the originator’s representations and breaches of those representations if 
any problems arise.  Id.  This further demonstrates how parties involved in the 
securitization process have little incentive to be concerned for the quality of the 
mortgage as they will not be liable if there is a problem with a loan. 
72 Assignee liability allows an individual to assert legal claims against the assignee 
of a loan. 
73 Peterson, supra note 36, at 2270–73. 
74 Eggert, supra note 38, at 548. 
75 See, e.g., In re Foreclosure Cases, 2007 WL 3232430 (N.D. Ohio, Oct. 31, 2007); 
Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Steele, 2008 WL 111227 (S.D. Ohio, Jan. 8, 2008); 
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requirement that foreclosing parties show proof of ownership 
prior to foreclosure.76  For example, MERS has been able to 
foreclose on loans without providing the original note.77  
Borrowers lose valuable information and evidence that could 
give rise to claims or defense when MERS is not required to 
produce the original loan.78 
Altogether, securitization has created a system that gives 
lenders and brokers financial incentives to push expensive loans 
with unfavorable terms for borrowers that ultimately increase 
the loan’s level of risk.  Additionally, the securitization of 
subprime loans make it de facto impossible to hold brokers, 
lenders, note holders, and investors accountable if they take 
advantage of a borrower.  As long as there is no duty on the 
lenders’ part to look out for the borrower, and so long as 
investors continue to heavily invest in loan securities, subprime 
loans will be a risky product for borrowers.  Therefore, the 
problems that securitization has caused must be addressed 
before effective regulation can take place to alleviate the 
subprime crisis. 
III 
FEDERAL REGULATIONS 
The federal government, through Congress and federal 
agencies, has taken several approaches to try to regulate and 
provide protection from the subprime mortgage market.  
Unfortunately, the resulting patchwork of regulations79 does not 
solve the problems of the subprime mortgage market effectively.  
The laws and regulations currently in effect include the Real 
Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974,80 the Truth in 
 
see also Gretchen Morgenson, Fighting for a Home: Bundled Mortgages and 
Dubious Fees Complicate Foreclosure Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, at C1. 
76 Morgenson, supra note 75 (noting University of Iowa Professor Katherine M. 
Porter’s study that found forty percent of foreclosures in 2006 did not require proof 
of ownership). 
77 Peterson, supra note 36, at 2266–67. 
78 Id. 
79 I use the term “regulations” to refer both to laws enacted by Congress and 
regulations passed by the various agencies that oversee banking and lending 
practices in the United States. 
80 12 U.S.C. § 2601(a) (2000). 
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Lending Act,81 the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act 
of 1994,82 and, most recently, a “Statement on Subprime 
Mortgage Lending” issued jointly by several federal monetary 
agencies. 
While those regulations do focus on typical subprime 
provisions, they apply only to the relatively small number of 
loans that include interest rates or fees high enough to trigger 
the laws’ effect.  As a result, lenders can often avoid such 
regulations altogether by structuring the rates or fees in such a 
way that avoids the “trigger” provision.  Moreover, in cases 
where the regulations do apply, lenders and brokers can often 
provide the borrowers with the required disclosures without 
actually ensuring the borrower fully understands the provisions 
of the loan.  Finally, none of the regulations addresses the 
problem of allowing note holders and MERS to file for 
foreclosure without the proper documentation. 
A.  The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
Congress enacted the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
(“RESPA”) to ensure borrowers receive better information in a 
timelier manner on the costs charged in the mortgage settlement 
process.83  Congress hoped that the requirements of RESPA 
would result in more well-informed borrowers.84  Having more 
well-informed borrowers would, by encouraging borrowers to 
compare various loan terms, eliminate the kickback and referral 
fees that increase loan costs.85  In addition, more well-informed 
borrowers would help drive down the amount borrowers are 
required to place in escrow to ensure the properties’ taxes and 
insurances would be paid.86 
To achieve those objectives, RESPA requires that lenders or 
mortgage brokers distribute booklets explaining the nature and 
costs of real estate settlement services within three business days 
of receiving or preparing an application for a borrower.87  
 
81 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2000). 
82 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (1994). 
83 12 U.S.C. § 2601(a) (2000). 
84 Id. § 2601(b)(1). 
85 Id. § 2601(b)(2). 
86 Id. § 2601(b)(3). 
87 Id. § 2604(a)–(d). 
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Additionally, either the lender or mortgage broker is required to 
give each borrower a good-faith estimate of the charges the 
borrower is likely to incur in connection with the settlement 
within three business days after the loan application is received 
or prepared.88  RESPA also requires the development and use of 
a standard real estate settlement form that clearly and 
conspicuously itemizes all of the costs of settlement.89  This form 
must be completed and made available to the borrower at or 
before the settlement, and the borrower is given the right to 
demand to review the form the day prior to the settlement 
signing.90 
RESPA, however, is inadequate.  Even assuming borrowers 
take the time to sit down and read the handbook, there is no 
guarantee they will understand the information they are given.91  
Providing extremely complicated information, particularly to 
unsophisticated borrowers, does not ensure they will understand 
it.  Regulations also need to ensure borrowers understand that 
information. 
B.  The Truth in Lending Act 
Congress enacted the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) in 1968 
to ensure borrowers understand the true cost of a loan, enabling 
borrowers to compare loans and thereby enhancing competition 
among lenders.92  To that end, TILA requires lenders to disclose 
all finance charges in terms of an Annual Percentage Rate 
 
88 24 C.F.R. § 3500.7(a) (2008); 12 U.S.C. § 2604(c) (2000). 
89 12 U.S.C. § 2603(a) (2000). 
90 Id. § 260 3(b). 
91 See Andrews v. Chevy Chase Bank, FSB, 240 F.R.D. 612, 615 (E.D. Wis. 2007). 
92 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2000).  The House Report on TILA demonstrates 
Congress’s desire that borrowers know the true cost of their loans, stating: 
If consumers are to plan prudently and to shop wisely for credit, they must 
know what it really costs.  In many instances today, consumers do not know 
the cost of credit.  Charges are often stated in confusing or misleading 
terms.  They are complicated by ‘add-ons’ and discounts and unfamiliar 
gimmicks.  The consumer should not have to be an actuary or a 
mathematician to understand the rate of interest that is being charged.  As 
a matter of fair play to the consumer, the cost of credit should be disclosed 
fully, simply, and clearly. 
H.R. REP. NO. 90-1040, at 9 (1967), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1962, 1965. 
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(“APR”).93  TILA also requires the clear and conspicuous 
disclosure94 of the creditor’s identity,95 the amount financed,96 
information regarding any variable interest rate,97 the payment 
schedule,98 and the total amount that will ultimately be paid by 
the borrower.99  TILA requires additional disclosures for high-
interest loans.100  Similar to RESPA, TILA requires that all 
disclosures be clear, conspicuous, in writing, and given to the 
borrower at least three days before the closing of the loan.101 
Additionally, TILA (as amended by the Home Ownership 
and Equity Protection Act) prohibits high-interest loans from 
including certain terms.102  The prohibited terms include balloon 
payments (unless the loan matures in less than one year), 
negative amortization, interest rate increases upon default,103 
and prepayment penalties after five years from the date the loan 
 
93 Truth in Lending, 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(e) (2008).  Title 12, Section 226 of the 
Code of Federal Regulations, known as “Regulation Z,” defines finance charges as 
“any charge payable directly or indirectly by the consumer and imposed directly or 
indirectly by the creditor as an incident to or a condition of the extension of credit.”  
12 C.F.R. § 226.4(a).  Examples of these additional charges calculated as the APR 
of a loan include loan fees, fees for a credit report, borrower-paid mortgage broker 
fees, and insurance protecting the creditor against the borrower’s default.  15 U.S.C. 
§ 1605(a)(1)–(6).  However, any charges imposed by a third-party closing agent are 
not required to be included in the finance charge.  Id. § 1605(a). 
94 12 C.F.R. § 226.17(a). 
95 Id. § 226.18(a). 
96 Id. § 226.18(b). 
97 Id. § 226.18(f).  If the loan on the borrower’s principal dwelling has a term of 
one year or less, the lender must disclose the circumstances under which the rate 
may increase, any limitation on the increase, the effect of an increase, and an 
example of the payment terms that would result from an increase.  Id. § 
226.18(f)(1).  If the term of a variable rate mortgage is more than a year, the 
disclosure need only state that the loan contains a variable interest rate and that 
variable rate disclosures have been provided earlier.  Id. § 226.18(f)(2). 
98 Id. § 226.18(g). 
99 Id. § 226.18(h) (the disclosure must contain a statement such as “the amount 
you will have paid when you have made all scheduled payments”). 
100 12 C.F.R. § 226.31(c).  High-interest loans are defined in Regulation Z as 
loans containing an APR exceeding the yield on treasury securities of comparable 
periods of maturity by more than eight percentage points for first-lien loans and ten 
percentage points for subordinate-lien loans, or those in which the total points and 
fees exceed the greater of eight percent of the total loan amount or $400.  Id. § 
226.32(a). 
101 Id. § 226.31. 
102 Id. § 226.32(d). 
103 Id. 
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was consummated.104  Furthermore, lenders are barred from 
refinancing a loan subject to TILA into another loan also subject 
to TILA, unless it is in the borrower’s best interest.105  A final 
key restriction under TILA prohibits high-interest loans that are 
based solely on the borrower’s collateral without concern for the 
borrower’s actual ability to repay the loan.106 
While TILA contains stricter disclosure rules than RESPA, 
those disclosure rules apply only to particularly high-interest 
loans.  Therefore, TILA’s stricter disclosure rules can be avoided 
if a loan charges rates and fees just below the trigger rate107 while 
maintaining otherwise unfavorable terms.  Unsurprisingly, 
lenders have been willing to do so,108 taking in more money in 
the long run by evading TILA’s stricter disclosure rules and 
encouraging a borrower to refinance a year later–charging the 
borrower yet another round of fees.  Additionally, TILA does 
not define what is in a borrower’s interest and thus allows 
lenders another loophole in refinancing a subprime loan. 
C.  Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act 
Similar to TILA, the Home Ownership and Equity Protection 
Act (“HOEPA”) prohibits high-interest loans from containing 
balloon payments, prepayment penalties, and negative 
amortization provisions.109  HOEPA also requires that several 
specific disclosures be given to borrowers at least three days 
before the closing of the loan, including the APR and the 
amount of the regular monthly payment.110  If the loan has a 
variable interest rate, the lender must also provide to the 
borrower a statement that the interest rate and monthly 
payment could increase, and state the maximum monthly 
payment that could result if the loan reached its maximum 
interest rate.111 
 
104 15 U.S.C. § 1639; 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d). 
105 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(3). 
106 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(4). 
107 Michael J. Pyle, A “Flip” Look at Predatory Lending: Will the Fed’s Revised 
Regulation Z End Abusive Refinancing Practices?, 112 YALE L.J. 1919, 1923 (2003); 
Eggert, supra note 38, at 588. 
108 Pyle, supra note 107, at 1923. 
109 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c)–(h). 
110 Id. § 1639(a)–(b). 
111 Id. § 1639(a)(2)(B). 
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However, HOEPA is ineffective because lenders can avoid its 
requirements in much the same way that lenders can avoid TILA 
requirements.  HOEPA is only triggered if a loan’s APR exceeds 
the yield on treasury securities of comparable periods of 
maturity by more than eight percentage points for first-lien loans 
and ten percentage points for subordinate-lien loans.112  
HOEPA’s regulations will also be triggered if the total points 
and fees the borrower has to pay exceed the greater of eight 
percent of the total loan amount or $400.113  As a result, HOEPA 
suffers from the same flaw as does TILA: loans with interest 
rates and fees set just below the trigger rate can still include the 
risky and confusing subprime loan provisions that have helped 
create the current crisis. 
While assignee liability is provided for under HOEPA,114 for 
that provision to have any effect the loan has to trigger HOEPA 
first.  This provides another incentive for lenders to charge rates 
and fees just below the trigger rate, because an investor is more 
likely to purchase a loan not subject to HOEPA’s assignment 
rule than one that is, in order to remain protected from liability. 
Even if a borrower brings a legal claim that his loan violated 
HOEPA, the borrower must clear significant hurdles in order to 
prevail.  For example, if the loan has been assigned, the 
borrower first has the difficult task of demonstrating that an 
assignee could tell from the face of the disclosure statement that 
it was inaccurate.115  Second, the borrower’s claim will not 
succeed if the assignee or purchaser proves by a preponderance 
of the evidence that, in exercising ordinary due diligence, a 
reasonable person would have been unable to determine 
HOEPA applied to the loan.116  Altogether, the burdens on the 
borrower are particularly high–meaning that even if assignee 
liability is present under HOEPA in theory, it may not be of any 
practical effect.  Thus, HOEPA may be unlikely to create 
assignee liability and ensure borrowers become informed. 
 
112 See id. § 1602(aa); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a). 
113 See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a). 
114 15 U.S.C. § 1641(d)(1). 
115 Id. § 1641(a). 
116 Id. § 1641(d)(1). 
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D.  Agencies’ Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending 
On June 29, 2007, several federal monetary agencies– 
namely, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve   
System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the 
National Credit Union Administration, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, and the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (the “Agencies”)–issued a “Statement on 
Subprime Mortgage Lending” to address concerns over lending 
practices in the subprime mortgage market.117  The Agencies’ 
statement, concerned primarily with option ARMs and teaser 
rates, provides guidance on the proper disclosures to be given to 
borrowers and underwriting practices for financial institutions 
that are overseen by the Agencies.118  The Agencies stated that 
financial institutions should explain introductory rates, 
prepayment penalties, balloon payments, the risks of “liar 
loans,” and whether the loan will include additional costs 
associated with taxes and insurance for the property in 
question.119  Requiring such explanations, the statement 
explains, is intended to ensure the borrower understands all the 
risks associated with the loan.120  The statement also 
recommends that lenders, when underwriting a loan, use a debt-
to-income analysis to approve loans based on a borrower’s 
ability to repay the loan.121  This includes the borrower’s ability 
to pay the higher interest rate after the introductory APR 
expires.122 
Even though the Agencies’ statement appears to give lenders 
an affirmative duty to ensure borrowers are well informed and 
understand the loan’s terms, the statement only applies to 
financial institutions that lend money from their depositors.123  
 
117 Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,569, 37,569 (July 
10, 2007) [hereinafter Agencies’ Statement]. 
118 Id. at 37,569. 
119 Id. at 37,573–74. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 37,574. 
122 Id. 
123 See Joseph A. Smith, Jr., The Federal Banking Agencies’ Guidance on 
Subprime Lending: Regulation with a Divided Mind, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 73, 74–
75 (2002) (stating that the Agencies regulate banking organizations including banks, 
thrift institutions, and their holding companies); Regulators Tighten Standards for 
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As most brokers and lenders are not actual banks with 
depositors,124 the statement will be an ineffective regulation in 
the subprime mortgage industry for three reasons.  First, the 
Agencies’ limited reach–in particular, the limits of their 
statement of guidance–demonstrates that the Agencies should 
not be depended on to protect borrowers.125  Second, the 
Agencies’ primary concern is to ensure the soundness of the 
banking and monetary system, not to protect consumers.126  
Finally, as with many lending regulations, merely giving 
borrowers disclosures does not ensure borrowers will actually 
understand them. 
IV 
STATE REGULATIONS 
Since federal regulations are inadequate to protect borrowers, 
the next logical question is whether state regulations are 
sufficient to protect borrowers where federal laws are not.  Here, 
I examine the laws of four states–Oregon, California, Florida, 
and Minnesota–to illustrate the variety of state regulations 
currently in place. 
Altogether, many of the regulations of California and 
Florida–two states particularly heavily hit by the subprime 
crisis–are nearly carbon copies of their federal counterparts.  
As a result, those state regulations are inadequate for largely the 
same reasons.  Minnesota’s regulations, also similar to the 
federal regulations, are flawed because the regulations can easily 
be avoided.  However, Minnesota contains a distinct provision 
that places an agency duty on brokers.  Oregon has come close 
to enacting many necessary regulations, but they have generally 
not made it past that state’s legislature. Importantly, none of 
these states address assignee liability or require note holders to 
produce the original loan documents prior to foreclosure.  
 
Subprime Mortgages, USA TODAY, June 29, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/ 
money/economy/housing/2007-06-29-subprime-standards_N.htm. 
124 See Regulators Tighten Standards, supra note 119 (reporting that the majority 
of lenders are independent businesses that loan money received through the 
securities market). 
125 Pyle, supra note 107, at 1926. 
126 See Federal Reserve Act § 2a, 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2000); Pyle, supra note 107, at 
1926. 
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Overall, none of these states have subprime loan regulations in 
place that adequately protect borrowers. 
A.  Oregon Regulations 
Although several Oregon laws regulate predatory lending 
practices in the realm of payday and title loans,127  Oregon 
currently has no law that specifically addresses subprime 
lending.  Oregon law currently does not limit the interest rate a 
financial institution can charge in issuing a loan128 as long as the 
“terms and conditions . . . are consistent with safe and sound 
banking practices.”129  However, “safe and sound banking 
practices” is not defined.  If one considers “safe and sound 
banking practices” to include the current federal banking 
practices that have allowed for the current crisis to arise, such a 
law is ineffective.  The law is also inadequate if it is “safe and 
sound” for lenders to have high finance charges.  For instance, 
Oregon law allows a licensee to include finance charges that, 
when expressed as an APR, do not exceed the greater of thirty-
six percent or thirty percentage points above the ninety-day 
discount rate for commercial paper charged by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco.130  Thus, because Oregon law 
prohibits only those loans that charge an interest rate above 
thirty percent–a regulation aimed squarely at short-term 
predatory “payday loans”–Oregon law fails to address 
subprime lending problems entirely.  Oregon law also fails to 
address assignee liability or production of original loan 
documents prior to foreclosure, and does not impose a duty on 
brokers to act in a borrower’s best interest. 
Not only does Oregon currently fail to regulate subprime 
loans, but the ideas that the Oregon legislature has put forth to 
address the subprime loan crisis, such as the proposed Oregon 
Home Loan Fairness Act, are also inadequate.131 
 
127 H.B. 2871, 74th Legis. Assemb. (2007) (focusing on payday loans and 
amending OR. REV. STAT. §§ 725.010, 725.045, 725.340, and others). 
128 OR. REV. STAT. § 708A.255 (2007). 
129 OR. REV. STAT. § 708A.250 (2007). 
130 See OR. REV. STAT. § 725.340 (2007), amended by H.B. 2871. 
131 S.B. 965, 74th Legis. Assemb. (2007).  Although S.B. 965 never became law, 
the bill is important to examine as it shows how the State of Oregon thinks the 
subprime problem might be solved. 
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Oregon Senate Bill 965, also known as the Home Loan 
Fairness Act, was introduced during the 2007 Oregon legislative 
session.  Although the Home Loan Fairness Act did contain a 
few well-thought-out provisions, it ultimately failed to become 
law.132  Oregon Senate Bill 965 attempted to address subprime 
lending practices in Oregon by making several improvements on 
existing federal regulations. 
Unlike HOEPA and TILA, Oregon Senate Bill 965 would 
have applied to all subprime loans regardless of the interest rate 
charged by the loan.133  Additionally, in contrast to the Agencies’ 
statement, the bill would have broadly applied to all lenders, 
including mortgage brokers,134 banks,135 credit unions, or 
licensees.136  The bill also would have required lenders of 
“nontraditional mortgages” to analyze a borrower’s repayment 
ability at the fully indexed rate137 rather than using the 
borrower’s credit score as an alternative to verifying a 
borrower’s income.138  Doing so would make sure borrowers are 
able to meet their payment obligations after the teaser rate ends 
and would reduce the number of borrowers in foreclosure.  
However, lenders would not be barred from issuing “liar 
loans”–those made without documentation of income or 
assets–as long as there were adequate reasons to support such a 
loan’s use, such as high credit scores, low debt-to-income ratio, 
significant liquid assets, mortgage insurance, and other factors.139 
Additionally, Oregon Senate Bill 965 followed the lead of 
laws in other states by prohibiting lenders from relying on the 
sale price or refinancing value of the property instead of the 
borrower’s ability to repay the loan when approving the loan.140  
 
132 Id.  That S.B. 965 failed to pass is surprising because subprime loans are 
similar to payday loans, which Oregon regulates heavily.  It seems reasonable that 
Oregon would also protect individuals from high-cost home loans. 
133 Id. 
134 See OR. REV. STAT. § 59.840(5) (2007) (defining the term “mortgage banker” 
as anyone who is compensated or expects to be compensated for making or 
negotiating a mortgage loan and either “[s]ervices or sells a mortgage banking 
loan”). 
135 Id. § 706.008(1). 
136 S.B. 965, 74th Or. Legis. Assemb. § 2(4) (2007). 
137 Id. § 5(3). 
138 Id. § 4. 
139 Id. § 5(1). 
140 See id. § 4(2)–(4). 
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The bill would also have forbidden no-money-down and 
negative amortization subprime loans unless the loans were 
issued under the significant mitigating factors used above.141  
Along with requiring certain disclosures by lenders,142 the bill 
would also have imposed a duty on lenders using a mortgage 
broker to ensure that the broker complies with the regulations.143  
The bill further stated that an appropriate step for lenders would 
be to create compensation incentives for brokers to issue loans 
consistent with the bill’s provisions.144 
Unlike its federal counterparts, Oregon Senate Bill 965 would 
have regulated lenders and the loans they could issue regardless 
of the interest rate.  However, the bill was problematic for 
several reasons.  First, rather than imposing a duty specifically 
on the broker, the bill imposed a duty on the lender to ensure 
brokers comply with the lender’s duties.145  The bill thus 
provided a remedy for borrowers against lenders but failed to 
provide a specific remedy for borrowers against brokers.  Since it 
is brokers who deal directly with borrowers, borrowers should be 
able to assert their rights in a cause of action against brokers as 
well as against lenders. 
Second, Oregon Senate Bill 965 failed to address the fact that 
many brokers and lenders either have inadequate assets to cover 
claims or disappear from the market after making a large 
number of loans.146  This is a problem because the holder in due 
course doctrine protects investors who own the mortgage note.147  
This leaves borrowers with no effective remedy because brokers 
and lenders are either insolvent or absent while the note holders 
are protected by law.  Finally, there was no attempt in Oregon 
Senate Bill 965 to force MERS or other note holders to file the 
original loan documents prior to foreclosure. 
While Oregon Senate Bill 965 had several promising 
provisions, it also had several shortcomings.  Further, the 
provisions never actually became law.  As a result, Oregon is left 
 
141 Id. § 5(3). 
142 Id. § 8–9. 
143 Id. § 7(3). 
144 Id. § 7(3)(b). 
145 See id. § 7. 
146 See id. 
147 OR. REV. STAT. § 73.0302 (2007).  Oregon’s holder in due course doctrine, 
codified in ORS 73.0302, is identical to the one codified in U.C.C. § 3-302. 
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without adequate regulations to protect borrowers from 
predatory subprime loan practices. 
B.  California 
Similar to the federal subprime loan regulations, California’s 
statutes appear more extensive than they are.  To begin with, 
California’s statutes prohibit and regulate several specific 
subprime loan provisions and practices.  Those provisions and 
practices include prepayment penalties, negative amortization, 
interest rate increases upon default, and loan flipping 
(unnecessarily refinancing one subprime loan into another 
subprime loan).148 
However, similar to HOEPA, these protections are only 
triggered by high-cost loans and can be avoided with a little 
planning on the part of the lender.  Under California law, the 
trigger rate for a first-lien loan is an interest rate of eight 
percentage points above the yield on treasury securities having 
comparable periods of maturity, or the total points and fees 
charged to the borrower exceeds six percent of the total loan 
amount.149  A loan charging interest rates slightly below those 
trigger rates–though it may contain several subprime provisions 
that would otherwise be prohibited–is not subject to those 
protections under the California law. 
Even if a loan does trigger the California statute, the statute 
contains loopholes that allow lenders to evade the regulations 
and still include subprime provisions in a high-cost loan.  For 
instance, although negative amortization is one of the provisions 
regulated, California law allows negative amortization if the 
originator simply discloses to the borrower that the loan 
provides for negative amortization and that such a provision may 
increase the loan principal.150 
California law also requires that the issuance of a loan must be 
based upon a borrower’s current and expected income, current 
 
148 CAL. FIN. CODE § 4973(a)–(c), (e), (j) (West Supp. 2008). 
149 Id. § 4970(b). 
150 See id. § 4973(c); see also id. § 4973(a)(2) (allowing prepayment penalties 
during the first thirty-six months of the loan if three conditions are met: the 
prepayment fee must not exceed the amount of six months’ worth of interest 
payments, the originator must also offer the borrower another loan without a 
prepayment fee, and the originator must disclose in writing at least three days prior 
to signing the loan that it contains a prepayment penalty). 
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obligations, and employment status, rather than merely the 
borrower’s equity.  Furthermore, ARM loans must be based on 
the borrower’s ability to repay at the fully indexed rate, not at 
the teaser rate.151  However, as mentioned above, these 
regulations only apply to high-cost loans; many lenders will 
simply be able to avoid the regulations by charging an interest 
rate just below the statutory trigger rate. 
Some might argue that California puts borrowers on notice to 
carefully inspect their loan documents because the California 
statute requires originators of a high-cost loan to provide the 
borrower a disclosure that recommends the borrower consult 
with a financial advisor prior to signing the loan.152  However, 
that requirement will not adequately protect borrowers so long 
as brokers and lenders have significant financial incentives to 
pressure a borrower not to consult with a financial advisor or to 
slip the notification in with the mountain of loan paperwork.153 
California law also provides protections for borrowers at the 
postlitigation level by explicitly allowing courts to award 
punitive damages to borrowers on top of actual damages and 
attorney fees.154  However, this statutory provision will not 
effectively deter loan brokers or originators if, because lenders 
often issue numerous loans and quickly disappear from the 
market, the borrower cannot find a party against whom to assert 
a claim. 
Moreover, California law does not require an original loan 
document to be submitted prior to foreclosure and explicitly 
does uphold the holder in due course doctrine for negating 
assignee liability.155  As a result, California’s regulations simply 
mirror many problems inherent in the federal regulations by 
upholding the holder in due course doctrine for mortgages, 
 
151 Id. § 4973(f)(1). 
152 See id. § 4973(k)(1). 
153 This is but one difficulty borrowers face when seeking remedies.  Although a 
borrower might be able to assert a legal claim against the originator, the originator 
will often be either insolvent or missing.  The borrower will then have to assert a 
claim against the assignee.  However, the holder in due course doctrine will shield 
the assignee from any liability because he would not have been able to tell from the 
loan documents alone that the originator did not give the borrower the required 
notifications. 
154 CAL. FIN. CODE § 4978 (West Supp. 2008). 
155 Id. § 4979.8. 
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failing to require production of the loan documents, and creating 
a set of toothless “requirements.” 
C.  Florida 
Like California, Florida only regulates risky loan provisions in 
high-cost loans.  However, because Florida’s law expressly defers 
to the definitions and criteria set out by HOEPA,156 lenders in 
Florida can easily avoid state regulations by charging an interest 
rate and fees just below the trigger rate.  While Florida’s statute 
is not as extensive, it does regulate several of the same 
provisions as California and the federal regulations.  These 
regulated provisions include prepayment penalties, negative 
amortization, repayment ability, and refinancing. 
Under Florida law, a subprime loan may not contain a 
prepayment penalty unless three criteria are satisfied: the 
prepayment must occur during the first thirty-six months of the 
life of the loan, the borrower must be offered another loan 
without a prepayment penalty, and the borrower must be given a 
disclosure of the terms–including the benefit the borrower will 
receive for accepting the prepayment penalty–at least three 
business days prior to closing.157  The language of this provision 
is troublesome because it does not guarantee that a borrower 
will receive information about the risks of prepayment penalties, 
which can be substantial. 
Florida law also prohibits subprime loans from containing 
provisions that will result in negative amortization158 and 
requires lenders to consider the borrower’s ability to repay the 
loan in addition to the borrower’s collateral when extending 
credit.159  Yet Florida law is silent in explaining how a lender 
should determine a borrower’s ability to repay a loan that 
contains a teaser rate: may a lender base that determination on 
only the initial rate, or must the lender take into consideration 
the fully indexed rate over the life of the loan? 
Finally, Florida does not allow a lender to refinance a high-
cost home loan to the same borrower within eighteen months of 
 
156 FLA. STAT. § 494.0079(7) (2007); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa) (2000); 12 
C.F.R. § 226.32(a) (2008). 
157 FLA. STAT. § 494.00791(1) (2007). 
158 Id. § 494.00791(3)–(4). 
159 Id. § 494.00791(6). 
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the original loan unless refinancing provides a “reasonable 
benefit to the borrower.”160  Therefore, a lender only has to wait 
until the nineteenth month to be free to refinance without regard 
to whether it might benefit the borrower.  Florida also upholds 
the holder in due course doctrine as a defense for purchasers of 
mortgage notes,161 providing a shield for investors who purchase 
the notes.  Thus, Florida regulations present the same problems 
as the federal regulations discussed above. 
D.  Minnesota 
In contrast to the laws of Oregon, California, and Florida, 
Minnesota law provides regulations that effectively protect a 
borrower where federal regulations do not.  To begin with, 
Minnesota regulates the kinds of provisions that originators, 
servicers, and brokers may include in loans.  For example, under 
Minnesota law, originators and servicers cannot lend a mortgage 
loan product that is of a comparatively lower investment grade 
to a borrower if, under the originator’s underwriting standards, 
the borrower’s data indicates he would qualify for a higher 
investment grade loan.  In other words, a lender may not push a 
borrower who qualifies for a prime loan into a subprime loan.162  
However, an originator or servicer may offer a lower investment 
grade loan after informing the borrower he would qualify for a 
better loan and receiving the borrower’s written consent.163  
However, as mentioned above, due to the mountain of 
paperwork involved in the purchase and financing of a home, a 
borrower’s signature on such a disclosure may not actually 
represent the borrower’s understanding that he or she may 
qualify for a loan of better quality. 
 
160 Id. § 494.00791(9).  A “reasonable benefit to the borrower” is not specifically 
defined.  However, the statute does state that lenders should consider “all of the 
circumstances, including, but not limited to, the terms of both the new and 
refinanced loans, the cost of the new loan, and the borrower’s circumstances.”  Id. 
161 Id. §§ 673.2031, 673.3021, 673.3031 (validating the holder in due course 
doctrine as a defense as long as the note was transferred for value). 
162 MINN. STAT. § 58.13 subdiv. 1(18) (2007).  A higher investment grade loan is 
characterized as one having a lower interest rate and lower discount points.  
Conversely, a lower investment grade loan will have a higher interest rate and 
higher discount points. 
163 Id. 
MYERS.FMT 12/1/2008  11:36:49 AM 
338 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87, 311 
Loan originators and servicers are also prohibited from 
issuing any loan with the “intent” that the loan will not be repaid 
so that the originator can obtain title to the property through 
foreclosure.164  This is problematic because requiring proof of a 
lending institution’s or an absent broker’s intent is extremely 
difficult to prove, making the law that much more difficult to 
enforce. 
Minnesota law also provides that originators and servicers are 
not allowed to assist a borrower to refinance into a new loan, 
unless it provides a “reasonable tangible net benefit” to the 
borrower.165  Originators and servicers are also prohibited from 
offering loans that would result in negative amortization during 
any six-month period, except for reverse mortgage loans.166  
Minnesota has also eliminated “liar loans” by requiring 
originators and servicers to verify the borrower’s ability to repay 
the loan, calculated at the fully indexed rate for variable interest 
rates.167  Originators are also barred from including penalties, 
fees, or charges for prepayment in subprime loans, regardless of 
whether that prepayment is in full or in part.168 
Minnesota uses a definition of “subprime loan” similar to that 
of the federal government, California, and Florida.  However, 
Minnesota’s definition uses a much lower interest rate.  For first-
lien variable rate loans, the rate of which does not decrease, a 
loan is classified as “subprime” if the interest rate exceeds two 
percentage points above treasury securities having comparable 
periods of maturity.169  All other first-lien mortgages fall into the 
subprime category if they contain an APR greater than three 
percentage points above treasury securities of comparable 
periods.170  For subordinate-lien loans, the APR has to exceed 
treasury securities of comparable maturity periods by five 
 
164 Id. § 58.13 subdiv. 1(13). 
165 Id. § 58.13 subdiv. 1(24). 
166 Id. § 58.13 subdiv. 1(26). 
167 Id. § 58.13 subdiv. 1(23). 
168 See id. § 58.137 subdiv. 2(c).  This is a very borrower-friendly provision.  
Conversely, many argue that prepayment penalties are necessary to ensure lenders 
receive their expected return on issued loans.  However, barring prepayment 
penalties is not unfair because most residential mortgages also contain a “due upon 
sale” clause.  This clause denies borrowers the use of the money loaned for the full 
term of the loan if they sell the home, which usually is the case. 
169 Id. § 58.02. 
170 Id. 
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percentage points.171  Because Minnesota’s “trigger” rates for 
subprime regulations are substantially lower than those of other 
states, Minnesota’s regulations will apply to a far wider range of 
loans.  Furthermore, such comparatively low “trigger” rates 
mean that for a lender to avoid statutory regulation, a loan 
would have to be set at a rate low enough to alleviate the effects 
of otherwise unfavorable loan terms. 
Beyond regulating subprime provisions in a greater number of 
loans, Minnesota law also imposes a uniquely effective “agency 
relationship” upon mortgage brokers that requires them to act in 
the borrower’s best interest with “the utmost good faith.”172  
That agency relationship prohibits brokers from receiving, 
giving, or charging any undisclosed compensation without the 
borrower’s knowledge.173  To ensure compliance, brokers are 
required to account for all of the compensation as the borrower’s 
agent.174  Minnesota also imposes a duty on brokers to carry out 
all lawful instructions given by their clients.175  Additionally, 
brokers are required to disclose all material facts to a borrower 
that may affect him.176 
Minnesota’s imposed agency relationship is a very progressive 
provision that will help ensure brokers look out for their clients, 
rather than merely seeking the terms that will be most 
advantageous to the lending parties.  However, to fully protect 
borrowers, Minnesota will have to require production of the loan 
documents prior to foreclosure and limit investor demand for 
these risky loans.  Altogether, Minnesota provides a good 
starting point but does not go far enough. 
V 
THE NEED FOR REGULATION 
In order to prevent another subprime crisis, state and federal 
regulations need to protect unsophisticated borrowers, impose 
assignee liability, and require foreclosing parties to provide 
original documents.  Current regulations are inadequate for 
 
171 Id. 
172 Id. § 58.161 subdiv. 1(1). 
173 Id. 
174 Id. § 58.161 subdiv. 1(5). 
175 Id. § 58.161 subdiv. 1(2). 
176 Id. § 58.161 subdiv. 1(3). 
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regulating subprime loans.  The federal government must 
impose more stringent regulations to limit the impact of the 
current subprime crisis on the economy and to prevent another 
subprime crisis from occurring in the future.  If proper 
regulations are not enacted, we risk repeating history as the 
financial climate again makes lenders willing to issue risky 
loans.177 
It is also important to note that tougher regulations will not, 
as some critics fear,178 cause lenders to stop issuing loans or cause 
the credit markets to shrink.  HOEPA, for example, did not 
drive lenders out of the market as critics feared.179  In fact, the 
number of subprime loans issued increased after the enactment 
of HOEPA.180 
Even if regulations do “tighten up”181 the credit available for 
subprime loans by limiting the number of loans lenders are 
willing to issue, such a change is unlikely to adversely affect 
those whom subprime loans are supposed to serve in the first 
place.  Subprime loans serve the wholly legitimate purpose of 
helping financially capable individuals with tarnished credit 
purchase homes.  Those individuals, unable to obtain a prime-
rate loan but willing to make higher monthly payments to 
compensate for the risk their poor credit presents to a lender, 
justify the issuance of subprime loans.  However, when lenders 
extend such loans to those without the financial means to meet 
their monthly obligations, the subprime market has overreached.  
If increased regulations “tighten up” the market, it will only 
serve to limit the issuance of subprime loans to those who should 
receive them. 
While often the increased risk such borrowers present justifies 
the higher rates and fees subprime lenders charge, lenders often 
go further than necessary in several ways.182  First, subprime 
 
177 See infra notes 199–202 and accompanying text (discussing the savings and 
loan crisis). 
178 See, e.g., Posting of Gary Becker to The Becker-Posner Blog, 
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2007/06/are_subprime_lo.html (June 
24, 2007, 23:35 EST). 
179 Eggert, supra note 38, at 587. 
180 Id. 
181 “Tightening up” credit refers to when lenders become conservative and issue 
fewer loans, reducing the amount of money available for borrowers. 
182 Keest, supra note 65, at 1133. 
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loans can include terms that are more unfavorable to borrowers 
than is necessary to compensate a lender’s risk.  Because the 
value of the home generally fully secures a mortgage, there is 
little need to further buttress a lender’s risk with extensive fees 
and interest rates.183  Second, lenders issue subprime loans more 
often than necessary: as many as thirty percent of those who 
could qualify for a prime loan are nevertheless steered by 
lenders into subprime loans.184  Third, lenders structure many 
subprime loans in a way that creates additional risk of 
foreclosure instead of compensating for the naturally higher 
level of risk such borrowers present.185  Thus, the government 
should regulate the market to ensure that lenders are seeking 
proper compensation for the increased risk, rather than taking 
advantage of, and creating additional risk for, unsophisticated 
borrowers. 
Not only do lenders overreach, but lenders also structure 
many subprime loans so that the borrower does not truly own his 
home.  Many borrowers do not put money down or make 
monthly payments that cover the monthly interest accrued.  
Moreover, falling home prices are destroying home equity. 
Current regulations (or the lack thereof) have created a market 
where approximately 8.8 million homeowners–more than ten 
percent of homeowners nationwide–have zero or negative 
equity in their homes.186  This number could increase to 13.8 
million–more than fifteen percent of the nation’s households–
if the market continues to worsen.187 
The subprime loan market has not only failed to help families 
truly own a home; it has also decreased overall U.S. 
homeownership.188  This decline results in part from the fact that 
 
183 Id.  I acknowledge that lenders may not recover 100% of their loan amount 
through foreclosure even though the loan is secured by the home.  However, 
sophisticated business executives choose to create, and invest in, such risky loans.  
Placing the risk of loss on those sophisticated parties rather than the underinformed 
borrower is reasonable.  Of course, the risk of loss should be shared equally–and 
probably placed on the borrower–if the borrower is also a sophisticated party such 
as a real estate speculator. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 J.W. Elphinstone, Home Equity Falls Below 50 Percent, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
NEWSWIRE, Mar. 6, 2008, available at 2008 WL 4770814. 
187 Id.  
188 CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 4, at 2. 
MYERS.FMT 12/1/2008  11:36:49 AM 
342 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87, 311 
the majority of subprime loans are not issued to first-time home 
buyers but rather to individuals refinancing a current loan or to 
individuals moving and upgrading their current home.189  In 
2006, only an estimated eleven percent of all subprime loans 
issued were for first-time home buyers.190  Stated in concrete 
terms, of more than three million subprime loans issued in 2006, 
only 354,172 brought new homeowners to the market.191  In that 
same year, an estimated 624,631 subprime foreclosures took 
place–resulting in a net homeownership loss of more than 
270,000 homes.192 
Worsening matters further, there will likely be a continued 
increase in foreclosures in the near future.  The number of 
subprime loan foreclosures has yet to reach its peak and is 
expected to increase until the fall of 2009.193  Additionally, the 
poorest-quality loans were issued in the fall of 2006 and will not 
adjust until 2008 and 2009.194  Given such immediate 
consequences, the federal government should not apply the 
“wait and see” approach.  Instead, it should begin finding ways 
to minimize the devastating impact these loans will have on 
families and stop such circumstances from recurring in the 
future. 
Critics argue against regulation for three reasons.  First, many 
argue credit is like any other commodity and, as such, the 
market should be able to charge whatever people are willing to 
pay for the commodity.195  Second, many critics claim that the 
wide publicity surrounding the subprime crisis has educated 
borrowers about the pitfalls of such loans.  As a result, they 
argue, borrowers will already be more careful and will closely 
scrutinize their loans before signing on the dotted line.196  Third, 
 
189 Id. at 3.  In 2006, fifty-six percent of all subprime loans were refinancing loans.  
Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 4. 
193 See Tom Fredrickson, NYC Foreclosures Mount: Defaults Forecast Through 
2008 as Rates Reset; Outer Boroughs Suffer, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS., July 30, 2007, at 1, 
1–8. 
194 Id. 
195 Posting of Richard Posner to The Becker-Posner Blog, http://www.becker-
posner-blog.com/archives/2007/06/subprime-mortga.html (June 24, 2007, 23:20 
EST). 
196 Id. 
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critics contend that only regulation of fraudulent lenders and 
brokers is needed, and, because such laws already exist, no new 
legislation is required.197 
Central to each of those arguments is the notion that market 
forces are sufficient to correct any current pitfalls.  However, the 
market only truly works if borrowers are educated and fully 
understand the product they are purchasing and the terms those 
loans include.  Unsophisticated borrowers who do not 
understand the terms of their loans–despite, for example, a 
disclosure statement buried in the closing paperwork–do not 
fully understand the true cost of their loan and how little of their 
home they will actually own. 
Such underinformed borrowers do not make up an effectively 
self-correcting market.  To the contrary, that market has created 
a situation where families continue to lose their homes and 
destroy the credit they were trying to build.  This situation is 
especially devastating considering its long-term effects.  It takes 
an average of ten to fourteen years for homeowners to reenter 
the market after relinquishing homeownership198 due to the debt 
and injury to credit caused by foreclosure. 
Additionally, homeowners and investors do not necessarily 
learn from others’ past mistakes.  The savings and loan crisis of 
the 1980s is an example.  The federal government’s deregulation 
of the savings and loan industry allowed thrifts199 to make riskier 
 
197 Id.; see also Greg Farrell, Former Bear Stearns Hedge Fund Managers 
Charged, USA TODAY, June 19, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/ 
brokerage/2008-06-19-bear-stearns-execs-charges_n.htm (reporting on two former 
Bear Stearns hedge fund managers accused of conspiracy and fraud by prosecutors); 
Kevin Johnson, Mortgage Fraud Probe Snares 406 Suspects, USA TODAY, June 16, 
2008, http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2008-06-19-mortgage-
fraud-arrests_n.htm (reporting on the Justice Department’s arrest of 406 
individuals–including attorneys, real estate agents, developers, loan brokers, and 
appraisers–who allegedly profited from housing scams). 
198 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., THE SUSTAINABILITY OF 
HOMEOWNERSHIP: FACTORS AFFECTING THE DURATION OF HOMEOWNERSHIP 
AND RENTAL SPELLS 43 (2004), available at http://www.huduser.org/publications/ 
pdf/homeownsustainability.pdf.  The study reports that whites take 10.7 years to 
reenter the housing market while African Americans take 14.4 years and Hispanics 
14.3 years.  Id.  The time spent out of the housing market depends on a number of 
different variables, including family size, weeks worked, weeks unemployed, age, 
marriage status, and sex.  Id. 
199 Thrifts are federally or state-chartered for-profit saving associations.  They are 
regulated by the FDIC and the Department of the Treasury through the Office of 
Thrift Supervision (“OTS”). 
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loans in order to remain profitable during the high interest rate 
and inflationary period in the late 1970s and 1980s.200  Thrifts 
poured money into the commercial real estate market, even 
though many of the loans were risky, oversaturating the 
commercial real estate market.201  This oversaturation resulted in 
many individuals defaulting on commercial real estate loans, 
causing thrifts to fail with them.202 
The residential real estate market is in a similar situation now.  
Lenders and brokers gave individuals risky loans, allowing those 
borrowers a greater opportunity to purchase property and 
thereby stimulating demand for housing.  This increased demand 
caused home prices to increase at unsustainable rates.203  Now, as 
homeowners begin to cash out their equity at the same time as a 
substantial number of other homeowners default or sell their 
homes to avoid defaulting, the residential market has become 
oversaturated with homes that are quickly losing value.204 
Additionally, similar to thrifts, many subprime lenders are 
having financial problems as many of the mortgages they issued 
are ending in foreclosure.  For instance, Bank of America, the 
second-largest bank in the United States, took more than a $3 
billion write-down205 due to its losses on subprime loans.206  
 
200 Paul T. Clark et al., Regulation of Savings Associations Under the Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 45 BUS. LAW. 1013, 
1020–22 (1990). 
201 Id. at 1020–21. 
202 Id. at 1020–22. 
203 OFFICE OF FED. HOUS. ENTER. OVERSIGHT, U.S. HOUSE PRICES CONTINUE 
TO RISE RAPIDLY 1–3, 8–9 (2005), available at http://www.ofheo.gov/media/pdf/ 
1q05hpi.pdf.  The average home price increased 12.5% between the first quarter of 
2004 and the first quarter of 2005.  Id.  Housing grew substantially faster than the 
rest of the consumer price index, which only grew at a rate of 3.1%.  Id.  While 
Oregon’s housing prices increased 12.9%, other areas of the country saw a much 
steeper price increase.  For example, Nevada, the District of Columbia, and Florida 
housing prices increased 31.22%, 22.21%, and 21.42% respectively in a single year.  
Id. 
204 Standard & Poor’s, supra note 26.  For example, the average home in 
Sarasota, Florida, and Reno, Nevada, lost $87,800 and $69,400 respectively between 
2005 and the second quarter of 2008.  See QUARTERLY REPORT, NAT’L ASS’N OF 
REALTORS, MEDIAN SALES PRICE OF EXISTING SINGLE-FAMILY HOMES FOR 
METROPOLITAN AREAS (2008).  The average home price decreased in San 
Francisco, Minneapolis, and Portland, Oregon, by $161,500, $16,300, and $12,200 
respectively in the year-ending second quarter of 2008.  Id. 
205 A write-down reduces the book value of an asset when it is overvalued 
compared to the true market value of the asset.  This is usually reflected as an 
expense on a company’s income statement, reducing net income.  A write-down 
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Merrill Lynch, the nation’s largest brokerage firm, was forced to 
write down $7.9 billion during the third quarter of 2007.207  
Finally, UBS took a write-down of $3.7 billion from subprime 
loan losses during the third quarter of 2007 and another $10 
billion on December 10, 2007.208  Even Barclays in London took 
a $2.7 billion write-down as a result of the subprime loan crisis in 
the United States.209 
The high default rate of subprime loans has led the federal 
government to bail out several companies.  First, the federal 
government seized control of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the 
nation’s two largest mortgage finance companies, at an 
estimated cost of more than $25 billion.210  Approximately one 
week later the federal government loaned American 
International Group, Inc., (“AIG”) $85 billion in an attempt to 
stop AIG from collapsing.211 
 
differs in form from a write-off, which is a deduction for business expenses.  See, 
e.g., JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN E. GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND 
INVESTMENT TERMS 793 (6th ed. 2003). 
206 For instance, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. had taken more than $6 billion in 
write-downs through July 2008 and announced in August 2008 that it would take 
another $1.5 billion write-down due to its losses on subprime loans.  David 
Weidner, J.P. Morgan Troubles Emerge with $1.5 Billion Write-Down, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 13, 2008, at C3, available at 2008 WLNR 15176720. 
207 Joe Bel Bruno, Mortgages Cause $7.9B Write-Down, Loss at Merrill Lynch, 
USA TODAY, Oct. 24, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/earnings/ 
2007-10-24-merrill_N.htm. 
208 Mark Landler & Julia Werdigier, UBS Records a Big Write-Down and Sells a 
Stake, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/11/business/ 
worldbusiness/11bank.html.  UBS is one of the leading international financial firms.  
Its world headquarters are in Switzerland; its North American headquarters are 
located in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. 
209 Julia Werdigier, Barclays to Make $2.7 Billion Write-Down, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
16, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/16/business/worldbusiness/16barclays 
.html. 
210 Stephen Labaton & Edmund L. Andrews, In Rescue to Stabilize Lending, U.S. 
Takes over Mortgage Finance Titans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2008, at A1. 
211 AIG’s problems are a little different from those of investors and lenders.  AIG 
got itself into financial problems by insuring mortgage-backed securities for 
investors.  See Edmund L. Andrews et al., Fed’s $85 Billion Loan Rescues Insurer, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at A1.  AIG’s insurance contracts required them to put 
up collateral to guarantee AIG could pay off investors’ claims.  In early September 
2008, credit rating agencies cut AIG’s credit ratings due to the declining value of the 
assets that AIG used to guarantee the insurance contracts.  These contracts 
required AIG to put up more assets to cover the decline in original asset value.  
However, AIG did not have enough assets to fulfill this obligation.  Thus, in an 
attempt to protect investors who bought insurance from AIG, the federal 
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Most troubling of all may be the financial problems suffered 
by investment bank and brokerage firm Bear Stearns.  Bear 
Stearns, which had already written down more than $1 billion in 
mortgage-related securities, was forced to accept a purchase 
offer from fellow financial services firm J.P. Morgan Chase of 
only $2 a share when its stock had been selling for $170 per share 
only a year earlier.212  If highly educated businesses and lenders 
have not learned from their own mistakes in making risky loans, 
borrowers are even less likely to do so–especially if the federal 
government has to bail out companies for making bad business 
decisions.213 
If market forces cannot be relied upon to force lenders to self-
correct, the federal government needs to step in, provide a fix 
for the high foreclosure rates, and ensure another savings and 
loan or subprime crisis does not happen in the near future.  The 
federal government’s regulation of the subprime market will 
ensure lenders practice safe underwriting standards and lend 
only to those individuals who have the financial resources to pay 
off their loans. 
VI 
HOW TO FIX THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
For federal and state governments to truly achieve the 
objective of protecting and creating educated borrowers, 
regulators need to realize that securitization has changed the 
 
government made a two-year, $85 billion loan to AIG.  The loan can be converted 
to common stock if existing shareholders approve.  If converted to common stock, 
the federal government would own eighty percent of AIG.  See id. 
212 Andrew Ross Sorkin, JP Morgan Pays $2 a Share for Bear Stearns, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 17, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/17/business/17bear.html. 
213 See H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. (2008) (containing a $700 billion bailout package 
for the U.S. financial markets); The Mortgage Implode-O-Meter Home Page, 
http://ml-implode.com (stating that 293 major U.S. lending institutions have 
“imploded” since 2006) (last visited Oct. 20, 2008). 
 The bailout plan allows the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase up to $700 
billion in mortgage-related assets.  It is not my position that the bailout is bad.  It 
may be necessary to stop the U.S. economy from a recession or even a depression.  
However, it is my position that such a proposal will limit the pain felt by wealthy 
investors where it hurts the most: their bank accounts.  There is no incentive for 
investors to self-correct unless they know they will not be bailed out for creating 
such risky investments.  If the law allows them to create risky investments, most 
likely, they will create risky investments.  Because the government has stopped the 
market from self-correcting, regulations must accompany any bailout plan. 
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mortgage transaction market.  None of the regulations currently 
in place fills the substantial disparity in education, experience, 
and access to information between borrowers on one side, and 
lenders, brokers, and investors on the other.214  Creating a more 
even playing field between the parties can be accomplished by 
imposing an agency duty on brokers,215 eliminating the holder in 
due course doctrine, and requiring MERS to disclose more 
information to borrowers.  Without such measures, 
circumstances will be ripe for another subprime crisis to occur. 
Furthermore, brokers cannot be trusted to create educated 
borrowers because brokers have monetary incentives to ensure 
borrowers remain uninformed and accept the most expensive 
loan possible.216  As long as this incentive exists, brokers will 
disclose only the required information and will do so in an 
uninformative manner.217 
Brokers are not the only party that benefits from uniformed 
borrowers.  Lenders, investors, and others involved in the 
securitization process also benefit financially from issuing the 
most expensive loans possible.  This kind of market will never 
 
214 Wilson, supra note 67, at 1493–94. 
215 I understand that this often is considered an issue for individual states.  
However, now that Wall Street securitizes these loans and mortgage transactions 
across state borders, the issue is one of federal law as well. 
216 Eggert, supra note 38, at 553.  In fact, many brokers are refinancing 
borrowers’ prime loans into unfavorable higher interest rate loans.  See Cathy 
Lesser Mansfield, Predatory Mortgage Lending, 1242 P.L.I./Corp. 9, 41 (2001). 
217 Wilson, supra note 67, at 1500–01.  Professor Wilson gives five examples of 
providing the required information in an uninformative way.  First, a broker can use 
language that a majority of individuals do not understand, such as “ysp” instead of 
“yield spread premium.”  Second, a broker can tell borrowers that the language on 
a form is just standard boilerplate language.  Third, a broker can provide 
nonresponsive answers that likely will not be questioned due to a borrower’s 
insecurities about appearing uneducated.  Fourth, a broker can convince a borrower 
that it is too late to change the terms or threaten to cancel the closing.  As Professor 
Wilson points out, this can be very effective because most subprime borrowers do 
not think they would qualify for a loan through another lender.  Finally, a broker 
can have the borrower sign a disclosure form with one or more blanks.  The broker 
then fills in the blanks after the closing.  This is significant because a borrower will 
then have to demonstrate he did not received proper disclosure forms even though 
the document has his signature on it. 
 It may be argued that borrowers should know not to sign an incomplete 
document.  However, the policy behind the federal regulations is to make sure 
borrowers receive and understand all of the crucial information concerning their 
loan.  As it stands, this policy is not being achieved under current regulations.  
Therefore, there is a need to figure out other ways to achieve this policy. 
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ensure that borrowers are educated, as there is no financial 
incentive to educate them.  Borrowers need someone in the 
process to represent their interests in these non-arms-length 
transactions (i.e., failure to have equal bargaining power and 
equal information regarding the transaction between the 
parties).  Brokers are in the best position to accomplish this goal. 
Brokers should have a duty imposed upon them that aligns 
their interests with those of borrowers.218  Imposing an agency 
responsibility on the broker–with the borrower as the 
principal–will ensure either that the borrower is educated 
enough to make a well-informed decision or that the broker will 
act in the borrower’s best interest.219  Further, this agency 
relationship should bar brokers from being compensated by the 
lender or purchaser of the loan.  Instead, a broker and a 
borrower should arrange a fee agreement prior to the broker 
performing his job of finding the borrower an appropriate loan.  
Requiring the borrower to pay the broker directly is not a 
detriment to the borrower; the borrower already indirectly pays 
the broker through fees and yield spread premiums.220  Doing so 
will ensure that the broker represents the borrower’s interest 
first, not their own bank accounts.  In a number of states, 
including Oregon, real estate brokers have an affirmative duty to 
deal in good faith and not act detrimentally or adverse to their 
clients’ interests.221  This same requirement should be placed on 
mortgage brokers arranging the financing. 
Imposing an agency duty will also make it difficult for brokers 
to take advantage of unsophisticated borrowers because such a 
relationship changes the evidentiary burden for borrowers who 
assert claims against brokers.  Borrowers will not have the 
burden of proving the existence or nonexistence of disclosures if 
a borrower tries to assert a claim or defense against the 
broker.222  Instead, with an agency duty the court will focus on 
 
218 Id. at 1503–19. 
219 Id. at 1512–13. 
220 Id. at 1513–16. 
221 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 696.805–822 (2007); see also Ronald Benton Brown et al., 
Real Estate Brokerage: Recent Changes in Relationships and a Proposed Cure, 29 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 25, 84–97 (1995). 
222 Wilson, supra note 67, at 1518–19 (discussing the difficulty of overcoming this 
standard because many brokers will sneak the documents into the papers to be 
signed by borrowers without ever making the proper disclosures). 
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whether the disclosures were made in a manner that would 
reasonably be expected to inform the borrower and whether the 
loan terms were in the borrower’s interest.223  This change would 
give brokers the incentive to make sure borrowers understand 
the terms in the loan, exercise due diligence in finding an 
appropriate loan for the borrower, or both.  In either scenario, 
the borrower likely is not injured and the broker has the 
incentive to perform his job as he should already be performing 
it.  Some brokers will exit the marketplace, but the brokers 
remaining in business will likely be more trustworthy and help 
individuals find affordable loans. 
While placing a duty on the broker will help ensure that a 
borrower is well informed, regulations also need to eliminate the 
holder in due course doctrine and require MERS to furnish the 
original note prior to foreclosure.  As described above, HOEPA 
fails to apply to most subprime loans, and there is no assignee 
liability for mortgage notes because the holder in due course 
doctrine shields buyers and assignees of a loan from a borrower’s 
claims.224  As a result, a borrower will only be able to seek 
redress against the broker or original lender.  This is an 
inadequate remedy for two reasons.  First, the broker or 
originator likely has closed or gone out of business.225  Second, 
the broker or lender may have inadequate assets to make the 
borrower or group of borrowers whole.226 
Furthermore, eliminating the doctrine from subprime 
mortgage transactions would be consistent with the Federal 
Trade Commission’s regulation that eliminates the doctrine for 
loans made for the acquisition of goods and services.227  This 
 
223 Id. at 1519. 
224 U.C.C. §§ 3-301–304 (2007); JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 508–09 (5th ed. 2000). 
225 See Peterson, supra note 36, at 2270–73 (noting that brokers and lenders have 
learned to set up businesses, flip as many loans as possible and quickly disappear, 
leaving consumers with no remedies). 
226 Eggert, supra note 38, at 546–47 (noting that with securitization of the loan 
industry, originators are able to lend more money than they have assets to cover 
any potential claims). 
227 See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 224, at 536–38.  This raises several 
interesting issues likely to arise when the subprime loan crisis, and the number of 
resulting lawsuits, really explodes.  First, it will be interesting to see if borrowers 
argue that the holder in due course doctrine does not apply to all of the refinance 
loans that were used to purchase cars, vacations, or used for home improvements.  
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would allow borrowers to seek redress against the owner of their 
loan and shift the risk of loss to the parties making money from 
the transaction–after all, that higher risk of loss is supposedly 
why the borrowers are paying a higher interest rate.  Without 
assignment liability, investors are receiving a profit windfall.  
The doctrine provides a shield from any costs associated with 
borrowers’ claims while giving investors a sword to recover all 
the financial benefits of the loan.228  Additionally, due to their 
knowledge, investors are in a better position than consumers to 
detect fraud and wrongdoing and thus are in a better position to 
bear the risk of loss.229  Removing investors’ ability to hide 
behind the doctrine will force them to exercise greater due 
diligence in examining the loans because they will bear the risk 
of loss.  This will likely decrease investors’ demand for risky 
loans and increase demand for higher quality loans, leading 
originators and lenders to stop issuing risky loans that they will 
no longer be able to sell on the securities market. 
In addition to eliminating the holder in due course doctrine, 
MERS should be required to notify borrowers when their loan is 
reassigned, and be required, along with every note holder, to 
produce the original note prior to foreclosure.230  Without these 
requirements, MERS will shield note holders because borrowers 
will be unable to discover who owns their loan and against whom 
to pursue a legal claim.  Additionally, in a number of 
foreclosures, MERS has been able to proceed without providing 
the original note.231  The original note can provide valuable 
information for a borrower’s claim or defense in a foreclosure.232  
Without this information, investors could still be de facto 
shielded from liability even though the holder in due course 
doctrine is eliminated.  This will ensure investors cannot hide 
behind MERS and will provide further incentives for investors 
to exercise due diligence in reviewing loans before they purchase 
them. 
 
Second, it will be interesting to see if courts in anti-deficiency states allow anti-
deficiency laws to protect borrowers that received these types of refinancings. 
228 Clayton P. Gillette, Holders in Due Course in Documentary Letter of Credit 
Transactions, 1 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 21, 36 (1982). 
229 Id. at 48. 
230 Peterson, supra note 36, at 2266–67. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. 
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Another improvement upon current regulations is illustrated 
by the use of high “trigger” rates.  As described above, current 
federal regulations often encompass only a small percentage of 
subprime loans.  Lenders are more than willing to charge fees 
and interest rates slightly below the trigger rates in order to keep 
risky provisions in the loans, avoid certain disclosure rules, and 
keep assignment liability out of the loan.  While the federal 
monetary agencies have taken a step in the right direction in 
encouraging greater disclosure, those agencies have a limited 
reach over lending institutions.  A better way to create educated 
borrowers would be to impose an agency relationship on brokers 
and take away any incentives a broker has to give borrowers the 
most expensive loan possible. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Predatory lending practices, a complex and slippery system of 
loan securitization, and ineffective state and federal regulations 
have all combined to create an environment in which borrowers 
are underinformed, taken advantage of, and left with inadequate 
tools to assert their rights.  Most troubling of all, the regulations 
currently in place will do little in the long run to prevent crises 
from occurring in the future. 
Both federal and state regulations must be vastly improved to 
address the problems that have arisen, and will continue to arise, 
from subprime lending.  The subprime loan market is too 
complex and smart for quick fixes.  Regulations will have little 
effect if lenders remain able to sidestep regulations by charging 
interest rates just below the trigger rates; borrowers cannot 
depend on being educated by brokers who have monetary 
incentives to ensure that borrowers stay uninformed and accept 
the most expensive loans possible; and the American public 
cannot regain solid footing if the subprime market continues to 
push loans that are of poorer quality than borrowers deserve and 
more costly than borrowers can repay. 
The current patchwork of legislation would best be 
overhauled by a single set of comprehensive federal regulations.  
Several elements are critical to such a regulatory change, 
including the prohibition of particularly unfavorable subprime 
provisions (such as negative amortization) except in limited 
circumstances, the imposition of an agency relationship on 
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brokers, the elimination (or significant limitation) of the holder 
in due course doctrine for residential mortgages, and the 
requirement that note holders produce original loan documents 
upon assignment.  Crucially, the restriction and regulation of 
subprime provisions must apply to all residential mortgages, not 
just high-cost loans. 
After the dust settles from the current subprime meltdown, 
adopting these broader and stronger protections will help to 
ensure another crisis does not arise anew.  To instead forget the 
lessons this crisis has taught–just as investors forgot the lessons 
of the Savings and Loan crisis–would be more costly than the 
nation’s economy can afford. 
 
